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Abstract
In statistical disclosure control, the goal of data analysis is twofold: The released
information must provide accurate and useful statistics about the underlying population
of interest, while minimizing the potential for an individual record to be identified. In
recent years, the notion of differential privacy has received much attention in theoretical
computer science, machine learning, and statistics. It provides a rigorous and strong
notion of protection for individuals’ sensitive information. A fundamental question is
how to incorporate differential privacy into traditional statistical inference procedures.
In this paper we study model selection in multivariate linear regression under the
constraint of differential privacy. We show that model selection procedures based on
penalized least squares or likelihood can be made differentially private by a combination
of regularization and randomization, and propose two algorithms to do so. We show
that our private procedures are consistent under essentially the same conditions as the
corresponding non-private procedures. We also find that under differential privacy, the
procedure becomes more sensitive to the tuning parameters. We illustrate and evaluate
our method using simulation studies and two real data examples.
∗jinglei@andrew.cmu.edu
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1 Introduction
In data privacy research, the goal of data analysis is to provide accurate and useful statistical
inference while preventing individual records being identified. Such privacy protection is
crucial in many statistical applications, namely for the analysis of census and survey data,
medical and clinical studies, genetics data, and web user data collected on the internet. In
statistics, the treatment of confidential data has a long history under the name of “Statistical
Disclosure Control” or “Statistical Disclosure Limitation”; see for example Dalenius (1977),
Rubin (1993), Willenborg & De Waal (1996), Fienberg & Slavkovic´ (2010) and Hundepool
et al. (2012). A long lasting challenge is to rigorously quantify the disclosure protection
offered by privacy-preserving data analysis procedures.
The notion of differential privacy has been introduced with the same objective in theoretical
computer science by Dwork (2006) and Dwork et al. (2006). The general idea of differential
privacy is to require for the outcome of a randomized data analysis procedure not to
change much for small perturbations of the input data, so that one can not infer from the
output the presence or absence of any individual in the input data set, or infer some of
the person’s characteristics. This requirement can be rigorously quantified, and does not
depend on assumptions regarding the resources of the intruder, including any access to
auxiliary information. Thus, differential privacy compares very favorably to measures of
disclosure risk commonly used in the statistical disclosure control literature as it is more
encompassing and a worst case definition, but at the same time it has been criticized as too
stringent from the perspective of achieving needed statistical data utility; e.g., see Fienberg
et al. (2010); Karwa & Slavkovic (2012).
Over the last decade, there has been a rapid development of differentially private algorithms
and procedures in both the computer science and statistics literature. For example, the main
focus in the computer science literature was on designing differentially private mechanisms
and efficient algorithms for private data release, e.g., the Laplace noise perturbation
mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006), the exponential mechanism (McSherry & Talwar, 2007),
releasing contingency tables (Barak et al., 2007), and boosting Hardt et al. (2010). On the
statistics side, research efforts include designing consistent and efficient differentially private
point estimators (Dwork & Lei, 2009; Smith, 2011; Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Lei, 2011; Bassily
et al., 2014; Karwa & Slavkovic´, 2016), non-parametric density estimation (Wasserman &
Zhou, 2010), hypothesis testing (Fienberg et al., 2011; Johnson & Shmatikov, 2013; Uhler
et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014; Karwa et al., 2014; Solea, 2014; Dwork et al., 2015; Sheffet,
2015; Wang et al., 2015; Gaboardi et al., 2016), and statistical lower bounds (Chaudhuri &
Hsu, 2011; Duchi et al., 2013); there is also a large literature on private PAC learning, which
echoes the concerns of statistical estimation in the context of classification (Kasiviswanathan
et al., 2011; Beimel et al., 2010, 2014, 2015; Bun et al., 2015; Karwa et al., 2015).
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In this paper we consider statistical model selection under the constraint of differential
privacy. Despite the fast development in combining statistical theory and methodology with
differential privacy, model selection under privacy constraints has not been well understood.
The problem of differentially private model selection is motivated by practical concerns:
when private data analysis procedures are needed, it is rarely known which model is most
appropriate for the data. When releasing the whole dataset is impractical due to privacy
concerns and releasing point estimates for pre-specified models has limited utility, an
appropriate compromise is to first identify the best model and then obtain and release
consistent point estimates for this model. Both tasks need to be performed under privacy
constraints, and thus we need methods for differentially private model selection.
In particular, we focus on the classical linear regression model selection. In particular, we
aim to provide insights for the following two questions. (i) Is it theoretically possible to
do model selection with differential privacy under the classical conditions? (ii) What new
practical concerns arise in model selection when differential privacy is required?
We first show that the answer to the first question is positive by proposing differentially
private model selection procedures based on penalized least squares and likelihood which
exhibit asymptotic utility guarantee. Here utility means that the procedure selects the
correct model with high probability under appropriate regularity conditions. In other words,
differentially private model selection is theoretically possible in the classical setting. More
specifically, we propose a two-step differentially private model selection procedure: we
first obtain a least square or maximum likelihood estimate under an `1 constraint, then
use noisy optimization with regularization to get the best model. Interestingly, the `1
constraint, usually employed in high dimensional problems, helps achieve privacy even in
low dimensions.
Second, from simulations and real data examples we observe that the finite sample behavior
of the proposed method depends crucially on the turning parameter required by the
procedure. For example, our algorithm imposes an `1 norm constraint on the estimated
regression coefficient. When the tuning parameter is conservatively chosen, i.e., the imposed
upper bound of the `1 norm is large, the utility is rather limited for the sample or moderate
sample sizes. When the sample size is in the thousands, the dependence of utility on
tuning parameter is less significant, as predicted by the theory. More importantly, if
auxiliary information is available, such as a good upper bound on the `1 norm of the
true regression coefficient, then we may be able to choose the tuning parameter more
adaptively, with improved utility. This reveals a distinct feature of differentially private
data analysis: Some auxiliary information that does not affect classical inference may lead
to significant performance improvement in differentially private analysis. Indeed, the `1
bound on the regression coefficient which improves the utility of our differentially-private
procedure is useful in Lasso when the dimensionality is high, but not so much in the classical
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regime.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we review the definition and
interpretation of differential privacy, as well as two general methods to create differentially
private algorithms. Section 3 details the two proposed differentially private model selection
procedures, with proofs of their privacy guarantee, and notes on the choice of the tuning
parameters. Statements and proofs of the utility guarantee of the two algorithms are given
in section 4. Empirical results, including a simulation study and two real data examples
are reported in section 5. Section 6 provides a brief discussion. All proofs and technical
details are collected in section 7.
2 Differential privacy
Differential privacy requires that the output of a procedure is not drastically altered under
small perturbations of the input data set, such that an attacker, regardless of his auxiliary
information and computing power, can hardly recover the presence/absence of a particular
individual in the data set. The notion of differential privacy is a property of that data
analysis procedure, rather than of the output obtained.
2.1 Definition
To formalize, consider a data set D = {z1, ..., zn} ∈ Zn consisting of n data points in sample
space Z. A data analysis procedure T , possibly randomized, maps the data set D, together
with a random input ω, to T (D) ≡ T (D,ω) ∈ S, an output space. Here we assume that
(S,S) is a measurable space and T (D, ·) : Ω 7→ S is a measurable function. Whenever it is
not confusing, we will use T (D) to denote the random variable T (D,ω).
For any two data sets D and D′ of the same size, we use Ham(D,D′) to denote their
Hamming distance, the number of entries at which they differ, regardless of the order. For
example, if Z = R and D = {1, 2, 3, 4}, D′ = {2, 3, 4, 5}, then Ham(D,D′) = 1. In the rest
of this paper, we always use D and D′ to denote a pair of adjacent data sets that differ at
the last entry: D = {z1, ..., zn−1, zn}, D′ = {z1, ..., zn−1, z′n}.
We can now state formally the property of differential privacy:
Definition 1 (-differential privacy, Dwork et al. (2006)). Given a privacy parameter,  > 0,
the procedure T satisfies -differential privacy if
sup
Ham(D,D′)=1,A∈S
∣∣∣∣log Pω(T (D′, ω) ∈ A)Pω(T (D,ω) ∈ A)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 
4
where we define log 00 = 0 for convenience.
In the above notation, Pω denotes the probability with respect to ω, which is the source
of randomness in the data analysis procedure. Thus, the definition does not impose any
conditions on the distribution of D — the privacy is required to hold for all pairs of adjacent
data sets. This stringent condition means that procedures which satisfy definition 1 provide
very strong privacy guarantees, even against adversaries who have considerable partial
information about the data set (Ganta et al., 2008). In order to satisfy this definition, any
nonconstant procedure must be randomized.
The -differential privacy is a strong requirement, as it takes supremum over all possible
neighboring data sets of size n. A mild relaxation is the (, δ)-differential privacy.
Definition 2 ((, δ)-differential privacy). Given  > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), a procedure satisfies
(, δ)-differential privacy if, for all measurable A ⊆ S and all neighboring data sets D, D′,
Pω(T (D) ∈ A) ≤ ePω(T (D) ∈ A) + δ .
Here the requirement of the original -differential privacy is relaxed so that the distribution
of T (D) only needs to be dominated by that of T (D′) outside of a set with probability no
more than δ.
In our discussion of statistical applications we will generally focus on data sets consisting
of a sequence of n independent random samples from an underlying distribution, and the
corresponding probability will be denoted PD. Note that differential privacy definition has
no such assumption. We will use PD,ω to denote the overall randomness due to both the
data and random mechanism in the analysis.
2.2 Statistical interpretation of differential privacy
Privacy protection due to differential privacy can be interpreted from a Bayesian perspective,
as in Abowd & Vilhuber (2008); Kasiviswanathan & Smith (2008). Suppose one has a prior
distribution of the input data set D and then gets to observe the random output T (D,ω).
Denote by Pi and Qi the marginal prior and posterior of Xi, for the ith entry in D. Then
if the procedure T is differentially-private and the prior P is a product measure on the
entries of D, we have that e− ≤ dPi/dQi ≤ e, thus limiting the information regarding Xi
gained from the output T (D,ω). A related hypothesis testing interpretation is given in
Theorem 2.4 of Wasserman & Zhou (2010).
One may also intuitively interpret differential privacy as a specific notion of robustness. It
requires that the distribution of T (D) is not changed too much if D is perturbed in only
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one entry. However, the definition of differential privacy is also a worst case definition,
where the probability ratio needs to be uniformly bounded over all pairs of adjacent input
data sets. A key ingredient to designing differentially private statistical procedures is to
bridge the gap between worst case privacy guarantee and the average case statistical utility.
It turns out that robustness and regularization are the most relevant structures to explore,
as in Dwork & Lei (2009), Chaudhuri et al. (2011) and Smith & Thakurta (2013).
2.3 Designing differentially private algorithms
For any statistical task which we want to carry, a specific randomized procedure T must be
designed to take as input a database D ∈ Zn and return an element of the output space
S while satisfying differential privacy. There exists a few approaches which are generic
enough to be adaptable to various tasks, and which are often used as building blocks for
more complicated procedures. We present two of these methods, which we use later in the
construction of our procedure. The first adds random noise to a non-private output and
the second samples randomly from a set of candidate outputs.
Adding Laplace noise The additive noise approach is applicable when the output space
is an Euclidean space. For presentation simplicity we consider here S = R. Let T (D) be a
non-private mechanism. Define the global sensitivity GT as
GT = sup
Ham(D,D′)=1
|T (D)− T (D′)| . (1)
If GT <∞, then it is easy to check (Dwork et al., 2006) that
T (D) ≡ T (D) + −1GT ζ (2)
satisfies -differential privacy, where ζ is a standard double exponential random variable
with density function 0.5 exp(−|ζ|) (also known as the Laplace distribution).
The exponential mechanism and noisy optimization The exponential mechanism
(McSherry & Talwar, 2007) is designed for discrete output spaces. Suppose S = {sα : α ∈ ℵ}
and let q : Zn×S 7→ R be a score function that measures the quality of s ∈ S in terms of its
agreement with the input data set. Usually q(D, s) = −|s− T (D)| for some deterministic
procedure T . Denote Gq = supsGq(·,s), where Gq(·,s) is the global sensitivity of the
mapping q(·, s). Let T (D) be the procedure that outputs a random sample from S with
probability
Pω(T (D) = s) ∝ exp
(
q(D, s)
2Gq
)
.
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Then T satisfies -differential privacy.
When S is finite, one may also use additive noise to approximately maximize q(D, s) over s.
Let
q˜(D, s) = q(D, s) + 2−1ζGq(·,s)
be the privatized score, where ζ is an independent draw from the standard double exponential
distribution. Then
T (D) = arg max
s
q˜(D, s)
satisfies -differential privacy and usually offers similar performance as the exponential
mechanism.
A generic scheme for (, δ)-differential privacy In many statistical problems the
sample space is not compact and hence GT =∞ for many statistics T such as the sample
mean. A general strategy is to show that one can add much less noise for most average
case data sets with (, δ)-differential privacy (Dwork & Lei, 2009). These methods often
involves the notion of local sensitivity of a deterministic procedure T :
GT (D) = sup
D′:Ham(D,D′)=1
|T (D)− T (D′)| . (3)
If GT (D) is finite and public, then one can show that adding noise to T (D) as in (2) with
GT replaced by GT (D) also gives -differential privacy. Unfortunately, GT (D) depends on
the data set and may contain sensitive information. However, there is a generic scheme
based on this idea with valid privacy guarantee under the following two general conditions
on the deterministic procedure T .
1. For all  > 0 there exists a real-valued function G∗(D) and a randomized procedure
T(D, g), which is -differentially private if g ≥ G∗(D) and is assumed to be non-
private.
2. Given  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists an -differentially private mapping G,δ(D)
satisfying Pω[G,δ(D) ≥ G∗(D)] ≥ 1− δ for all D.
An example of G∗(D) is the local sensitivity of some procedure T (D), and T is the noisy
version as in (2) calibrated to a upper bound of the local sensitivity.
Proposition 2.1. Under the above two assumptions, for any 1 + 2 = , and δ ∈ (0, 1),
T2(D,G1,δ(D)) satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy.
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3 Differentially Private Model Selection Procedures
Popular methods of model selection for linear regression include information criteria such as
AIC (Akaike, 1974) and BIC (Schwarz et al., 1978), cross-validation (Picard & Cook, 1984),
and the more recent penalized least squares (e.g., Tibshirani, 1996; Fan & Li, 2001). In this
paper we focus on penalized least squares and penalized profile likelihood estimators, both
being variants of the classical approach based on information criteria.
3.1 Background: Linear regression and model selection
In the linear regression model, the data points are independent, each consisting of a response
Y ∈ R1, and a covariate X ∈ Rd, which satisfies
Y = XTβ0 +W (4)
where β0 ∈ Rd is the regression coefficient, and W is a Gaussian random variable, indepen-
dent of X, with mean zero and variance σ2. The observed data set is D = {(Xi, Yi) : 1 ≤
i ≤ n}, where Xi = (Xi1, ..., Xid)T .
The model selection problem is to find the support of β0: M0 ≡ {j : β0(j) 6= 0}. To give a
precise formulation, consider a class of candidate models M ⊆ {0, 1}d that contains M0.
For each M ∈M, the corresponding hypothesis is β0 ∈ ΘM ≡ {β ∈ Rd : β0(j) = 0, ∀ j /∈
M}.
Given a parameter (β, σ2) and an observed data set, the log likelihood is, ignoring constant
terms,
`(β, σ2;D) =
n∑
i=1
[
−1
2
log σ2 − 1
2σ2
(Yi −XTi β)2
]
.
We consider two cases separately.
Known variance. When σ2 is known, we aim to find the β that maximizes the log
likelihood, which leads to model selection with the least squares. Without loss of generality,
we assume σ2 = 1. We then define
`(β;D) =− 1
2
n∑
i=1
(Yi −XTi β)2 , (5)
β̂M = arg min
β∈ΘM
−2`(β;D) , (6)
`(M ;D) =`(β̂M ;D) . (7)
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Unknown variance. In the more realistic setting that σ2 is unknown, we can maximize
over the nuisance parameter σ2 to perform model selection with the profile likelihood.
Ignoring constant terms, we obtain the profile log-likelihood for β:
`∗(β;D) = −n
2
log
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Yi −XTi β)2
]
, (8)
Maximizing this over all β in ΘM , we get
`∗(M ;D) ≡ sup
β∈ΘM
`∗(β;D). (9)
Information criteria. One could simply maximize `(M ;D) or `∗(M ;D) as given above.
However, more complex models tend to yield larger values of log likelihood. The approach
of information criteria thus minimizes the sum of negative log likelihood and a measure of
model complexity. For example, in the case of unknown σ2, one choose the model by
M̂ = arg min
M∈M
−2`∗(M ;D) + φn|M | , (10)
where φn is the amount of penalty on the model complexity. The best known and most
widely used examples are the AIC (φn = 2), and BIC (φn = log n).
In the case of known σ2, the penalized minimization becomes
M̂ = arg min
M∈M
−2`(M ;D) + φn|M | . (11)
It is worth noting that the penalized least square estimator, with appropriate choice of φn,
can also be used in the case of unknown σ2.
3.2 Towards Differentially Private Model Selection
To perform model selection in a differentially-private manner, we propose to apply the
exponential mechanism or noisy minimization to the minimization problems (10) and (11),
with q(D,M) (here s in the general definition is replaced by M) given by the penalized
likelihood
L∗(M ;D) ≡ −2`∗(M ;D) + φn|M |
in the case of penalized log profile likelihood (10), or
L(M ;D) ≡ −2`(M ;D) + φn|M |
in the case of penalized least squares (11).
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A key step in this approach is to evaluate and control the sensitivities of L(M ;D) and
L∗(M ;D) as functions of D for any M ∈M.
To simplify the notation and concentrate on the main idea, we will assume in the sequel
that the data entries are bounded or standardized:
max
1≤i≤n
|Yi| ≤ r, max
1≤i≤n,1≤j≤d
|Xij | ≤ 1 , (12)
where r is a known number that can grow with n. Boundedness is typically required for
differentially private data analysis. Standard methods for finding the range of the data
set in a privacy-preserving manner include those given in Dwork & Lei (2009) and Smith
(2011).
3.2.1 Sensitivity of least squares and profile log-likelihood
As indicated in Section 3.1, we consider procedures based on two score functions for a
model: the sum of squared residuals `(M ;D), and the profile likelihood `∗(M ;D).
To bound the sensitivity of either of them, we must bound the possible parameter vectors
we consider. We thus consider constrained versions of the two score functions. Given R > 0,
we define
− 2`R(M ;D) = min
β∈ΘM ,‖β‖1≤R
−2`(β,D) . (13)
and
− 2`∗R(M ;D) = min
β∈ΘM ,‖β‖1≤R
−2`∗(β;D) . (14)
The sensitivity of the least squares loss is now easy to bound:
Lemma 3.1 (Sensitivity of constrained least-squares). When β has `1-norm at most R
and the data (Xi, Yi) are restricted to [−1, 1]d × [−r, r], the global sensitivity of the squared
error loss functions −2`(β; ·) and −2`R(M ; ·) is at most (r +R)2.
The proof is both short and elementary, and hence omitted.
In the case of the constrained profile likelihood, we can not bound the global sensitivity,
but we can find a bound on the local sensitivity:
Lemma 3.2 (Local sensitivity of constrained the profile likelihood). Under the same
conditions as in Lemma 3.1, the local sensitivity of −2`∗R(M ; ·) is no larger than
n(r +R)2
−2`R(M ;D)− (r +R)2 .
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Algorithm 1 Model Selection via Penalized Constrained Least Squares (PCLS)
Input: Data set D = {(Xi, Yi) : i ∈ {1, ..., n}}, collection of models M, parameters
r,R, φn, .
Output: Estimated model M̂ ∈M
for each model M in M do
`R(M ;D)← max
β∈ΘM ,‖β‖1≤R
−1
2
n∑
i=1
(Yi −XTi β)2
LR(M ;D)← −2`R(M ;D) + φn|M |
L˜R(M ;D)← LR(M ;D) + 2(r+R)
2
 ZM , where ZM is a Laplace random variable
end for
Return arg min
M∈M
L˜R(M ;D)
3.2.2 Algorithms
Lemma 3.1 implies that the penalized constrained lease squares
LR(M ;D) = −2`R(M ;D) + |M |φn,
can easily be minimized in an -differentially private manner. The complete algorithm is
given below.
Next, Lemma 3.2 gives an upper bound of the local sensitivity of L∗R(M ;D). Now we apply
the generic scheme of designing (, δ)-differentially private algorithms described in section
2.3.
First let
G∗(D) ≡ n(r +R)
2
minM −2`R(M ;D)− (r +R)2 .
Then G∗(D) is an uniform upper bound of the local sensitivity of LR(M ;D) for all M . The
only private part in G∗(D) above is minM∈M−2`R(M ;D), which has global sensitivity
(r +R)2 according to Lemma 3.1. Thus following the general procedure in Section 2.3, a
valid choice of G(D) for −2`∗R(M ;D) is
G(D) =
n(r +R)2
minM −2`R(M ;D)− (r +R)2 + −1(r +R)2
(
ZG − log 12δ
)
where ZG is a standard Laplace random variable.
Then we can construct the final estimators using either exponential mechanism or the noisy
minimization, both satisfying (2, δ)-differential privacy. The complete algorithm is given
in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Model Selection via Penalized Constrained Profile Likelihood (PCPL)
Input: Data set D = {(Xi, Yi) : i ∈ {1, ..., n}}, collection of models M, parameters
r,R, φn, δ, .
Output: Estimated model M̂ ∈M
for each model M in M do
`∗R(M ;D)← max
β∈ΘM ,‖β‖1≤R
−n
2
log
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Yi −XTi β)2
]
L∗R(M ;D)← `∗R(M ;D) + φn|M |
L˜∗R(M ;D)← L∗R(M ;D) + 2G(D) ZM where
G(D) =
n(r +R)2
minM −2`R(M ;D)− (r +R)2 + −1(r +R)2
(
ZG − log 12δ
) ;
`R(M ;D) is as in Algorithm 1, and ZG, ZM are Laplace random variables;
end for
Return arg minM∈M L˜∗R(M ;D)
3.3 Choosing the tuning parameters
Both algorithms introduced above require two tuning parameters: an upper bound R of
the `1 norm of the regression coefficient, and the penalty parameter φn. In the context
of privacy-preserving data analysis, there are two requirements on the quality of any
inference procedure: privacy and utility. Both proposed methods satisfy their corresponding
-differential privacy (Algorithm 1) and (2, δ)-differential privacy (Algorithm 2) for any
choices of R and φn. Regarding utility, our theoretical analysis shows that both algorithms
achieve consistent model selection for a wide range of R and φn.
However, our numerical experiments in section 5 show that the performance of our proposed
algorithms is sensitive to the choice of these tuning parameters. We acknowledge that
fully data-driven and privacy-preserving methods for choosing these tuning parameters
remain a challenging and important open problem, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
Data-driven choice of penalty parameter is a hard problem even without privacy constraint.
Here we provide some heuristics on potential solutions.
Regarding choosing R, the ideal choice would be the `1 norm of the true regression coefficient.
In practice, a good choice of R should be close to ‖β0‖1. This can be achieved by finding a
differentially private estimate of the maximum `1 norm of β̂M over all M ∈ M, which is
feasible if only a single number is released.
Regarding choosing φn, a good choice of φn needs to be large enough so that it dominates
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any statistical sampling noise in the data and the additive noise due to privacy constraints.
On the other hand, φn cannot be too large, because otherwise it will introduce substantial
bias in the selected model. Taking the penalized least squares estimator for example, a good
φn shall roughly be the difference of the largest `(M ;D) and the second largest `(M ;D),
which can possibly be estimated with differential privacy as a single number.
4 Utility Analysis
In privacy-preserving data analysis, the privacy shall be protected for any possible input
data set. In other words, the privacy guarantee needs to cover the worst case and must
be established with no distributional conditions on the data set. In the previous sections,
our differentially private procedure only requires the data to be bounded, which can be
verified or enforced easily in practice. On the other hand, the statistical utility (for example,
consistency, rate of convergence) is usually based on common statistical assumptions on the
data. To facilitate discussion, we first introduce some notation and assumptions.
Notation. Let X be the n × d design matrix, and Y the n × 1 vector of Y ’s. For any
M ∈ M, let XM be the n × |M | design matrix consisting of the columns in M . Then
β̂M is a d × 1 vector that is (XTMXM )−1XTMY on the entries in M and zero elsewhere.
It is the ordinary least square estimate under model M . The sample covariance is Σ̂ =
n−1XTX.
Assumptions. We state below five assumptions required for our utility results, and
discuss their practical significance.
Our first assumption is a sparse linear model with Gaussian noise.
A0. (Linear model with Gaussian noise) The data entries (Xi, Yi)
n
i=1 are generated from
the linear regression model (4) with a regression coefficient vector β0 with d0 = ‖β0‖0
and b0 ≡ minj:β0(j)6=0 |β0(j)|. The noise Wi are iid Gaussian with mean zero and
variance σ2.
Next we assume that the number of candidate models grows polynomially with sample size
n. This is usually the case when we only search over sparse models and the total number of
variables grows polynomially in n.
A1. (Candidate models) The set of candidate models M contains the true model M0 =
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{j : β0(j) 6= 0}, and has cardinality no more than nα for some positive number α
which is allowed to grow with n. The largest candidate model has d¯ variables.
The worst-case sensitivity of the log likelihood is hard to control because the design matrix
X may be poorly conditioned. Thus we need to add some singular value condition on the
design matrix.
A2. (Design matrix) The design matrix X is fixed, and the sample covariance satisfies the
sparse eigenvalue condition:
κ0 ≡ inf
1≤‖β‖0≤d¯+d0
βT Σ̂β
‖β‖22
> 0.
Assumption A2 excludes the situation of linear dependence between columns of XM0
and XMc0 . A similar condition has been considered in the literature on model selection
consistency using information criteria (Nishii, 1984). The condition stated here is for fixed
design matrix X, but it holds with high probability for many random designs. Assumption
A2 also implies an upper bound of the range of β̂M . Such a boundedness property will help
control the sensitivity of the log likelihood.
Moreover, as we did in section 3, we assume boundedness of the data entries, which are
typically needed for developing differentially private procedures.
A3. (Boundedness) Each entry of Y is bounded by r, and each entry of X is bounded by
1.
Finally, we assume that the sample size is large enough, when compared to other quantities
in the analysis such as the noise variance, and the inverse of privacy parameter .
A4. (Sample size) The sample size n is large enough so that equations (18), (19), and (20)
hold.
4.1 Utility of Penalized Constrained Least Squares
We first give a utility result for the noisy penalized constrained least squares estimator
(Algorithm 1).
Theorem 4.1. Assume A0-A4 hold. If φn satisfies
2A(1 ∨ σ2) log n ≤ φn ≤ 1
4 ∨ (1 + 2d0)κ0b
2
0σ
2n ,
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where A = 2(α+ c) for some c > 0, and
R ≥ r
√
d¯
κ0
,
then the PCLS estimator M̂ given by Algorithm 1 with privacy parameter  and penalty
parameter φn satisfies
PD,ω(M̂ 6= M) ≤ nα exp
(
− φn
4(R+ r)2
)
+
1 + 2d¯√
2piA log n
n−c .
Recall that PD,ω stands for taking probability over both the randomness in D and in the
generation of Laplace random variables (denoted by ω) in the algorithm. Here we are
assuming a fixed design matrix, so the randomness in D is equivalent to the randomness of
the additive noise W .
4.2 Utility of Penalized Constrained Profile Likelihood
Now we provide utility result for the noisy penalized profile likelihood estimator.
Theorem 4.2 (Utility of penalized profile likelihood). Assume A0-A4 hold. If φn satisfies
4A log n ≤ φn ≤ 2
3|M0|n log
(
1 +
κ0b
2
0
4σ2
)
,
where A = 2(α+ c) for some c > 0, and
R ≥ r
√
d¯
κ0
then for any constant c > 0 and n large enough as quantified in (18) to (20), the selected
model M̂ given by the noisy penalized constrained profile likelihood (Algorithm 2) satisfies
PD,ω
(
M̂ 6= M0
)
≤ nα exp
(
− σ
2φn
64(R+ r)2
)
+ 3n−A/2 + 2d¯n−c .
5 Empirical Results
We have shown in the last section that the two proposed differentially-private model
selection procedures are consistent under similar conditions as the corresponding non-
private algorithms. We now provide some empirical results for model selection via penalized
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constrained least squares, to illustrate both the utility of the algorithms and impact of
tuning parameter selection as discussed in section 3.3.
5.1 Simulation study
We consider two different regression models, both of the form Y = XTβ0 +W, where X is
an n by 6 matrix with columns sampled independently from the uniform distribution on
[−1, 1] and W is standard normal, but the regression coefficients are different. The first
model uses β0 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) whereas the second model uses β0 = c(1.5, 1, 0.5, 0, 0, 0).
Note that the `1 norm of β0 is 3 in both cases, and thus the oracle value for R. However,
the first model should be easier to recover from data.
In the simulations, we consider a small sample size (n = 100) and a moderately large sample
size (n = 1000), as well as R ∈ {1, 2.5, 3.5, 10},  ∈ {0.1, 1, 5, 10} and φ ∈ [0, n/2]. For each
set of parameters, we sample 500 data sets from the true model, apply Algorithm 1 to each
of them, and note the proportion of times we correctly identify the correct model. We set r
to be the maximum observed value of Y in the data set.
Figure 1 shows the results for model 1 where β0 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0). Except for with the
smallest value of R the procedure is very successful at choosing the correct model over a
wide range of φ values. The poor results for R = 1 are explained by the fact that since R is
much smaller than the true `1 norm of β0, the parameter can not be estimated properly.
When R is too large, the estimation of β0 is unchanged, but a larger amount of noise is
needed to satisfy differential privacy, which explains the small drop in utility. As expected,
decreasing  needed to provide stricter privacy also leads to decreased utility. Note however
that for n = 1000 the method is very accurate for a wide range of φ even for  as small as
1. The results also confirm our claim that the choice of φ is less crucial for larger sample
size, as the procedure works well on an entire interval. Note also that the actual value of φ
depends on n, with the optimal φ increasing roughly linearly with n.
Figure 2 shows the results for case where β0 = c(1.5, 1, 0.5, 0, 0, 0). The effect of n, R, φ
and  are very similar in this case, but the choice of R and φ are more important to achieve
good utility. The sensitivity of the procedure to choices of R and φ thus depends on the
structure of the true parameter β0. Note however that for n = 1000 a proper choice for the
parameters leads to completely accurate model selection with  = 5, and even very accurate
for  = 1 with R = 2.5.
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Figure 1: Proportion of correct model selection from 500 independent replications of Algo-
rithm 1 selecting among the 63 possible models when the true model has β = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0).
Various values of n, R, φ and  are illustrated, and r is set to the maximum value of Y .
There is a large range of φ for which the private procedure does as well as without privacy,
and in fact picks the correct model. As n increases, the task becomes easier. Note that the
proper value of φ increases with n as well.
5.2 Application to Real Data Sets
We first illustrate the results of model selection via penalized constrained least squares on a
small data set of 97 observations, then on a much larger one with hundreds of thousands
observations.
Prostate data set The prostate data set contains several clinical measures for 97 men
with prostate cancer. In this paper, our goal is to predict the level of a prostate specific
antigen using five continuous variables: the volume of the cancer, the weight of the prostate,
the age of the patient, the capsular penetration and the benign prostatic hyperplasia amount.
Except for age, all variables are taken on the log scale. We also rescale all of the variables
to take values between −1 and 1, which could be done in a differentially private way.
We consider all possible main effects models for the model selection procedure, for a total
of 63 models to choose from. Model selection based on the penalized maximum likelihood,
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Figure 2: Proportion of correct model selection from 500 independent replications of
Algorithm 1 selecting among the 63 possible models when the true model has β =
(1.5, 1, 0.5, 0, 0, 0). Various values of n, R, φ and  are illustrated, and r is set to the
maximum value of Y . The utility of the procedure depends crucially on the choices for R
and φ. As n increases, the task becomes easier. Note that the proper value of φ increases
with n as well.
without the constraint of differential privacy, selects the model with only two variables in
addition to the intercept: the volume of the cancer, and the weight of the prostate. Model
selection is then performed using Algorithm 1 for various choices of R, φ and . We set
R = 5.68, obtained with the non-private algorithm, and we set r to the maximum value of
Y .
Figure 3 shows the proportion of times that the private and non-private procedures identify
the correct model, for 5000 independent replications. With such a small data set, the
choice of R and φ are crucial: even without differential privacy, using too large a value
of φ does not identify the correct model. Due to the small sample size, the utility of the
private procedure also decreases quite rapidly with decreasing  which should offer more
privacy.
Housing dataset Since the constrained optimization can be implemented based only
on sufficient statistics, the private procedure scales very well for much larger data sets.
The housing data set contains several variables measured on 348, 189 houses sold in San
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Figure 3: Model selection on the prostate data set for the private and non-private procedures.
Results show the proportion of times that the correct model is selected for 5000 independent
replications. Various values of R, φ and  are illustrated. Because of the small sample size,
the choice of R and φ as more impact, and the utility is quite small for usual choices for .
Francisco Bay Area between 2003 and 2006. In addition to the price of the sale, the data
include the year of the transaction (an ordinal variable with 4 levels), the latitude and
longitude of the house, the county in which it is located (a categorical variable with 9
levels), and a continuous measure of its size. We preprocess the data to remove houses with
price outside the range 105 to 905 thousand dollars, and size larger than 3000 sqft. We also
combine some of the small counties into a new indicator variable. All predictors are also
scaled so that they take values in [−1, 1]. The resulting data set contains 235, 760 with 13
variables.
We consider again models with main effects only, for a total 8191 models to choose the
best model from. Since the optimal model is not as clear as with the previous example, we
do not directly compare the private procedure with a gold standard, but rather with its
non-private counterpart. An algorithm which offers differential privacy but recovers the
results of a non-private algorithm is successful. As above, we apply the model selection
procedures with various values of R, φ and , and use the maximum value of Y as r.
Figure 4 shows the agreement between the private and non-private procedure for various
tuning parameters. With this large data set, the results are very positive: even for  = 1
we recover the same model with the differentially-private procedure as without the privacy
requirement for φ chosen large enough. Note also that, as expected, the scale of φ is much
larger than for the smaller Housing example.
6 Discussion
With modern data acquisition and storage techniques allowing the collection and analysis
of huge amounts of personal information in a multitude of formats, protecting individual
privacy inevitably becomes of crucial concern for modern data analysis. Although differential
privacy offers mathematically strong and elegant privacy guarantee, the nature of such
a conservative constraint in the context of everyday statistical analysis remains unclear.
Previous works on statistical analysis with differential privacy mainly focused on simple
statistical queries, such as location and scale statistics, regression coefficients, and simple
hypothesis testing, and network analysis. In this paper we considered the more challenging
problem of model selection in the classical setting. We showed that standard techniques
for differentially private data analysis can be combined with known statistical tools such
as penalized least square or information criteria to construct privacy-preserving model
selection procedures with strong utility. We proposed two algorithms for this task, and
proved privacy and utility results for each of them.
Our procedures feature a double-regularization, as they include both constrained estimation
in the fitting step, and penalization in the model comparison step. Thus the method involves
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Figure 4: Model selection on the housing data set. The y axis shows the proportion of
time that the DP procedure selects the same model as the non-private version. Results
represent 1000 independent replications of Algorithm 1. Various values of R, φ and  are
illustrated. Even with small values of , the private procedure returns the same model as
the non-private one, for a large range of φ.
two tuning parameters. A key observation, illustrated in section 5, is that although we
have proven good large-sample properties for a wide range of penalty parameter φn and
R, the practical performance is sensitive to the particular choices for these parameters. In
other words, these tuning parameters play a very important and unique role in designing
differentially private procedure with good practical performance. While in low-dimensional
settings, the regularization parameter is not needed for statistical inference without privacy
constraints, when privacy is a concern, a carefully chosen amount of regularization can lead
to stable, low-sensitivity estimators even in the worst case. Appropriate choice of both
tuning parameters thus reflects the need for some additional information in the data that
will be useful for differentially private procedures, but not necessary in traditional inference
methods. It will be an interesting future topic to give a general characterization of such
privacy related quantities, and to develop differentially private methods to estimate these
quantities.
7 Appendix: Proof details
7.1 Proofs
We first provide proofs of the theorems.
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof.
Pω[T (D,G(D)) ∈ A]
≤Pω[T (D,G(D)) ∈ A,G(D) ≥ G∗(D)] + P[G(D) < G∗(D)]
≤
∫
u≥G∗(D)
Pω[T (D,u) ∈ A]dPG(D)(u) + δ
≤
∫
u≥G∗(D)
e2Pω[T (D′, u) ∈ A]dPG(D)(u) + δ
≤
∫
u≥G∗(D)
e2Pω[T (D′, u) ∈ A]e1dPG(D′)(u) + δ
≤ePω[T (D′, G(D′)) ∈ A] + δ.
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Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. Given a candidate model M , the log likelihood is, ignoring constant terms,
−2`∗(M ;D) = n log
(
n−1
n∑
i=1
(Yi −XTi β̂M )2
)
.
Let β̂′R,M be the constrained least square estimator with input data set D
′. By boundedness
of Yi, Xi and β̂R,M we have (Yi −XTi β)2 ≤ (r + R)2 for all β such that ‖β‖1 ≤ R. Then
using the fact that log(x/y) ≤ (x− y)/y for x ≥ y, we have
∣∣2`∗R(M ;D′)− 2`∗R(M ;D)∣∣ = n ∣∣∣∣log( `R(M ;D)`R(M ;D′)
)∣∣∣∣
≤max
{
(Y ′n −X ′Tn β̂R,M )2
n−1
∑n
i=1(Yi −XTi β̂R,M )2
,
(Yn −XTn β̂′R,M )2
n−1
∑n
i=1(Y
′
i −X ′Ti β̂′R,M )2
}
≤ n(r +R)
2
−2`R(M ;D)− (r +R)2 .
Next we prove our main utility theorems. The proofs of Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 rely
on the following result, which is a consequence of simple linear algebra.
Proposition 7.1. We have ‖β̂M‖1 ≤
√
d¯/κ0r for all M ∈M. As a result, if R ≥
√
d¯/κ0r
then β̂R,M = β̂M , `(M ;D) = `R(M ;D), and `
∗
R(M ;D) = `
∗(M ;D) for all M ∈M.
Proposition 7.1 allows us to remove the `1 constraint in our analysis. Although Proposition
7.1 implies that the `1 constraint is inactive, such a constraint cannot be removed from the
algorithms because it is used to bound the worst-case sensitivity of the estimators.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. We prove for noisy minimization. The argument can be adapted simply to cover the
exponential mechanism.
Define
∆(M) = [−2`(M ;D) + 2`(M0;D)] .
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Then according to Proposition 7.1, we can work directly with the unconstrained version.
PD,ω(M̂ 6= M) ≤
∑
M ′∈M
PD,ω
(
−2`(M ′;D) + φn|M ′|+ 2(R+ r)
2

ZM ′ ≤
−2`(M0;D) + φn|M0|+ 2(R+ r)
2

ZM0
)
≤nαPD,ω
{
2(R+ r)2

(Z1 − Z2) ≥ sup
M ′ 6=M0
[
∆M ′ + (|M ′| − |M0|)φn
]}
.
For M ′ ⊃ M0, using Claim 2 in Section 7 we have supM ′:M ′⊃M0 ∆M ′ ≥ −Aσ2(|M ′| −
|M0|) log n with probability at least 1− d¯−d0√2piA lognn−c. Thus with same probability we have
sup
M ′⊃M0
∆M ′ + (|M ′| − |M0|)φn ≥ (|M ′| − |M0|)(φn −Aσ2 log n) ≥ φn/2 . (15)
For M ′ *M0, we have by Claim 3 in Section 7, with probability at least 1− 1+d¯√2piA lognn−c,
sup
M ′*M
∆M ′ + (|M ′| − |M0|)φn ≥ 1
2
κ0b
2
0σ
2n− |M0|φn ≥ φn/2 . (16)
Thus conditioning on Ec2 ∩ Ec3, which has probability at least 1− 1+2d¯√2piA lognn−c, we have
Pω(M̂ 6= M0) ≤ nα exp
(
−φn
2

2(R+ r)2
)
.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. Consider events E1–E5 as defined in Section 7. We focus on the event
(⋃5
k=0Ek
)c
,
which has probability at least 1− 3n−A/2 − 2d¯n−c.
Because R ≥ r
√
d¯
κ0
by Proposition 7.1 we have −2`∗(M ;D) = −2`∗R(M ;D) for all M
under consideration.
Next we bound the difference between −2`∗(M ;D) and −2`∗(M0;D). Denote
∆∗(M) = −2`∗(M ;D) + 2`∗(M0;D) .
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In the case of M ⊃M0, applying the fact that − log(1− x) ≤ x/(1− x) for x ∈ (0, 1) to
x = 1−
∑n
i=1(Yi −XTi β̂M )2∑n
i=1(Yi −XTi β̂0)2
we have
0 ≤−∆∗(M) = n log
( ∑n
i=1(Yi −Xiβ̂0)2∑n
i=1(Yi −Xiβ̂M )2
)
≤ n −∆(M)−2`(M ;D)
≤2A(|M | − |M0|) log n , (17)
where the last step follows from the fact that we are not in the event E0 ∪ E1 ∪ E2 defined
in Section 7.
In the case of M *M0,
∆∗(M) =n log
(
1 +
∆(M)
−2`(M0;D)
)
≥ n log
(
1 +
κ0b
2
0
4σ2
)
because we are in Ec0 (which implies −2`(M0;D) ≤ 2nσ2 by Claim 1) and Ec3 (which implies
∆(M) ≥ nκ0b20σ2/2 by Claim 3).
Therefore, when
4A log n ≤ φn ≤ 2
3|M0|n log
(
1 +
κ0b
2
0
4σ2
)
,
we have
L∗R(M ;D)− L∗R(M0;D) ≥ φn/2, ∀M 6= M0 .
On the event considered, we also have G(D) ≤ 4(R + r)2σ−2 by Claim 5. Then we can
bound the error probability by
Pω[M̂ 6= M0|D,G(D)] =
∑
M∈M,M 6=M0
Pω[M̂ = M ]
≤
∑
M∈M,M 6=M0
exp
(
− 
4G(D)
(L∗R(M ;D)− L∗R(M0;D))
)
≤nα exp
(
− φnσ
2
64(R+ r)2
)
.
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7.2 Further proof details
Here we give details and summarize the multiple “with high probability” statements in the
utility analysis. Recall that
∆(M) = [−2`(M ;D) + 2`(M0;D)] .
Let A = 2(α+ c), assume
n
log n
≥max
{
64Aσ2
κ0b20
,
4d¯σ2
κ0b20
, 8Ad¯
}
(18)
d0 ≤n/8 (19)
 ≥(R+ r)
2
(
A
2 log n+ log
1
2δ
)
nσ2
4 − (R+ r)2
(20)
We define the following events and give the corresponding probability bounds.
1. Define
E0 :=
{
D : −2`(M0;D)σ−2 ≥ (n− d0) +
√
2(n− d0)A log n+A log n
}
(21)
E1 :=
{
D : −2`(M0;D)σ−2 ≤ (n− d0)−
√
2(n− d0)A log n
}
. (22)
Claim 1. PD(E0) ≤ n−A/2, PD(E1) ≤ n−A/2. Also using Eq. (18), we have
−2`(M ;D) ≤ 2nσ2 on Ec0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that σ2 = 1. Then −2`(M0;D) = ‖Y −
PΠ0Y‖22 = ‖PΠ⊥0 W‖
2
2 is a χ
2 random variable with n− d0 degrees of freedom. The
first claim follows from Lemma 1 of Laurent & Massart (2000). The second claim can
be verified directly.
2. Define
E2 :=
{
inf
M∈M,M⊃M0
∆(M)
σ2(|M | − |M0|) < −A log n
}
(23)
Claim 2. PD(E2) ≤ d¯−d0√2piA lognn−c .
Proof. Because M ⊃M0,
0 ≤ −∆(M) = ‖Y −Xβ̂M0‖22 − ‖Y −Xβ̂M‖22
= ‖Xβ0 + W − PΠ0(Xβ0 + W)‖22 − ‖Xβ0 + W − PΠM (Xβ0 + W)‖22
= ‖W − PΠ0(W)‖22 − ‖W − PΠM (W)‖22 = ‖(PΠM − PΠ0)(W)‖22.
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Because M0 ⊂M , PΠM−PΠ0 is a projection operator of dimension |M |−|M0|. Using a
tail probability bound for Gaussian random variables, we have, for all A = 2(α+c) > 0,
P
[
∆(M)σ−2 ≤ −A(|M | − |M0|) log n
] ≤ (|M | − |M0|)√
2piA log n
n−A/2 ≤ d¯− d0√
2piA log n
n−A/2.
The desired result follows from union bound.
3. For M +M0, let M1 = M0\M , M2 = M0 ∩M , J∗M =
√
nκ0b20|M1|. Define
E3 :=
{
inf
M∈M,M+M0
∆(M) ≤ (J∗M )2 − 2σJ∗M
√
A log n− (|M | − |M2|)A log n
}
. (24)
Claim 3.
PD(E3) ≤ 1 + d¯√
2piA log n
n−c .
and under Ec3 and equation (18)
∆(M) ≥ 1
2
κ0b
2
0σ
2n , ∀M ∈M, M +M0 .
Proof. Denote β0,M the vector that agrees with β0 on M and 0 elsewhere.
∆(M) = ‖Y − PΠM (Y)‖22 − ‖PΠ⊥0 (W)‖
2
2
=‖PΠ⊥M (Xβ0) + PΠ⊥M (W)‖
2
2 − ‖PΠ⊥0 (W)‖
2
2
=‖PΠ⊥M (XM1β0,M1)‖
2
2 + 2〈PΠ⊥M (XM1β0,M1), PΠ⊥M (W)〉+ ‖PΠ⊥M (W)‖
2
2 − ‖PΠ⊥0 (W)‖
2
2
≥‖PΠ⊥M (XM1β0,M1)‖
2
2 + 2〈PΠ⊥M (XM1β0,M1),W〉 − ‖PΠ0,M∩Π⊥0 (W)‖
2
2 ,
where Π0,M is the linear subspace spanned by XM0∪M .
Let J = ‖PΠ⊥M (XM1β0,M1)‖2. Then the second term in the above equation is dis-
tributed as N(0, σ2J2). By the eigenvalue condition, we have J2 ≥ κ0nb20|M1|, where
κ0 is the minimum sparse eigenvalue and b0 is a lower bound of the signal level. To
see this, observe that M ∩M1 = ∅ and
J =
∥∥∥PΠ⊥M (XM1β0,M1)∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥(XM1 ,XM )( β0,M1−(XTMXM )−1XTMXM1β0,M1
)∥∥∥∥
≥√nκ0
∥∥∥∥( βM1−(XTMXM )−1XTMXM1βM1
)∥∥∥∥
≥√nκ0 ‖βM1‖ ≥
√
nκ0|M1|b0,
where the first inequality uses the sparse eigenvalue condition.
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Note that the dimension of ΠM ∩ Π⊥0 is at most |M | − |M2|. Let J∗ :=
√
κ0nb20.
Using (18) we know that J ≥ J∗ ≥ 4√A log n. Then with probability at least
1− (1 + |M | − |M2|)n−A/2/
√
2piA log n ≤ 1− 1+d¯√
2piA logn
nA/2, we have
∆(M)σ−2 ≥J2 − 2σJ
√
A log n− (|M | − |M2|)σ2A log n (25)
≥(J∗)2 − 2σJ∗
√
A log n− σ2d¯A log n (26)
≥1
2
κ0b
2
0n (27)
where the last inequality uses eq. (18). The claim follows from union bound.
4. Define
E4 :=
{
D : inf
M∈M
−2`(M ;D) ≤ σ2n/2
}
. (28)
Claim 4. E4 ⊆ E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3 .
To see this, first note that on (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3)c, we have minM∈M−2`(M ;D) ≥
σ2(n− d0 −
√
2(n− d0)A log n−A(d¯− d0) log n) ≥ nσ2/2 using eq. (18)–(19).
5. Define
E5 := {zG < −A log n/2} . (29)
Claim 5. Pω(E5) =
1
2n
−A/2 ≤ n−A/2. On Ec4 ∩ Ec5, we have, using eq. (18)–(20),
G(D) ≤ 4(R+ r)
2
σ2
.
The proof is elementary and omitted.
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